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Setting the Scene
In April 1998 the Cash Economy Task Force (1998) produced an influential
Australian  report  entitled  Improving Tax Compliance in the Cash Economy.
Improving Tax Compliance in the Cash Economy proposed a new Compliance
Model for the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) with  four elements: (a)
understanding  taxpayer  behaviour; (b) building community partnerships; (c)
increased flexibility in ATO operations to encourage and support compliance; and
(d) more and escalating regulatory options to enforce compliance. During late 1998
and  early  1999, the question was asked whether or not the Cash Economy
Compliance Model was relevant to tax compliance for the large  business market
segment. At the time there were doubts.
This chapter opens up some issues for consideration about applying the model
to  the ATO’s compliance work on large  business.  Preliminary  examination
revealed that the four elements of the model mentioned above all have relevance to
large business, though a different kind of relevance than in the case of the  cash
economy. This chapter is structured around considering each of these elements in
turn. The spirit of the chapter is to identify a number of policy ideas that might
give meaningful content to the model in the large business context.
The Compliance Problem in Large Business?
‘Compliance means that taxpayers are meeting their obligations in accordance with
the  Income  Tax Assessment Act, regulations and court decisions.’ This is the
definition  adopted by one influential ATO large  business  report on ‘Staff
Perceptions of the Compliance Behaviour of the Top 100 Companies  Audited
Under  the  Large  Case Program’ (Australian Taxation Office, 1995). The report
went on to show that in the large corporate domain ATO staff adopted a more
purposive view of compliance than the somewhat literalist view in the above
definition. That is, ATO staff working on the Large Case Program were  looking
for compliance with the spirit of the law or the policy purpose intended by the
parliament. Doreen McBarnet’s (1992) British  work  (see McBarnet, Chapter 11,
this volume) has shown that large corporates themselves tend to be literalists
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five  options:  (a)  comply with the intention of the law; (b) compromise by
negotiating how a particular law works under particular circumstances and making
a deal on how it will be applied; (c) comply with the letter of the law in such a
way that the declared objectives of the law may not be met (McBarnet calls  this
compliance in form); (d) transform the legal rules, through lateral  thinking, into
positive routes for tax avoidance; and (e) break or ignore the law and hope not to
be caught. This could include the preparation of secondary accounts to cover any
tracks (Williams, 1995). McBarnet (1992) found that large corporations tended to
pursue a strategy of compliance in form to achieve two things:
If  successful, it allows taxpayers to escape tax...But at the same time, whether
successful in that first goal or not, it allows them to escape any risk of stigma or
penalty (p. 334).
In light of the above, an ATO compliance objective could be compliance with
the purposes of tax law, while working to increase the certainty with which those
purposes can be applied in practice. An alternative objective would focus on
‘dollar-based information...as potentially ambiguous risk management data rather
than unambiguous taxpayer  compliance data’ (Wickerson, 1993, p. 7). Such an
objective that bypasses the concept of compliance might be reducing risks to the
revenue while upholding the requirements of tax law and increasing the certainty
of that law.
Enforcement
Although this chapter  will  argue  that the ATO Compliance Model provides a
valuable  framework  for large business  compliance  work, the concepts and
enforcement strategies through which one escalates in a large corporate compliance
pyramid will be found to be quite different  from those in a cash economy
compliance pyramid. For example, at the peak of the ATO’s Compliance Model
enforcement pyramid, the ATO confronts disengagers from the tax system using a
prosecutorial strategy. Many individual taxpayers and small businesses do opt out
of the tax system altogether. Even some larger businesses that we call organised
crime (but that in reality is rather  disorganised) do this.  They do not play the
game, sometimes because they are so cynical or disenchanted about it, sometimes
to evade it in a calculative way. But some large businesses, on the other hand, are
quintessential  game players. At the peak of the  large  business  enforcement
challenge are the most entrepreneurial of the  players of the tax planning game.
Disengagement is not a major source of non-compliance here.
There is no problem with adapting the ATO Compliance Model to this reality
of  large corporate compliance. The idea of a compliance pyramid is that all
compliance staff will discover a content for it that is relevant to the context in
which they work. It is not a recipe book but a model to guide strategic thinking.
The deeper question about the model for the compliance of large businesses is thatLarge Business and the Compliance Model 179
it tends to assume that the majority of taxpayers want to comply and as we move
up to more and more serious tax evasion, there are fewer and  fewer  taxpayers in
this category. Evidence on individual taxpayers suggests that this assumption is
fairly accurate. For example, US audit evidence  has  been  used to conclude that
about two-thirds of individual taxpayers intend to pay the right tax (some of them
inadvertently cheat), but only a third of individual taxpayers  actually  set out to
cheat in a significant  way (and then to varying degrees)  (Andreoni,  Erard and
Feinstein, 1998, p. 820).
With large corporations in Australia, it is clear that many more than two-thirds
of taxpayers intend to comply with the letter of the law, or at least to have a
‘reasonably arguable position’ that they have done so most of the time. However,
it seems equally clear that there are many who do not intend to comply with what
the ATO regards as the policy purposes of the parliament’s tax laws. The evidence
for this is that more than half of them pay no tax, some for many years, which is
certainly not parliament’s intention.
2 Australia collects more than the Organisation
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) average in company tax as a
proportion of all tax revenue  and as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) and is one of the few countries in the late 1990s that saw corporate tax
revenues increase at a faster rate than the increase in company profits. The corporate
tax collection crisis is not distinctively an Australian one.
From these known patterns of taxpaying, the fact that compliance policy must
confront squarely is that while the pattern of individual compliance is broadly
pyramidal, the pattern of large corporate compliance is egg-shaped, with  most
taxpayers playing for the grey (see Figure 9.1). Large corporate compliance strategy
might be conceived as pushing the large grey bulge in the middle of the egg
downwards into the white zone – so that the egg becomes a pyramid.
It is hard to make compliance strategies work when compliance behaviour is
egg-shaped. As corporate compliance behaviour takes on more of a pyramidal
shape, the compliance policies discussed in this chapter will progressively become
more effective.  The task is more daunting than for tax collection with small
business and individuals because  the reality of the challenge is majority  non-
compliance with the policy purposes of the law (at least as they are conceived by
many officers of the ATO). The argument to be made here is that law reform is the
first of three key circuit breakers to move that grey  bulge down into the white.
Two further circuit-breakers are proposed in this chapter: One is for the compliance
debate to take a more democratic turn, the other is for it to take a more
international turn. This chapter  seeks to show that once  these three  circuits are
broken,  there  are a number of more specific policy options for  improving
compliance.180 Taxing Democracy
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Figure 9.1 Patterns of individual and corporate tax compliance
Tax Compliance in a Democracy
The Australian people increasingly believe that large corporations and high wealth
individuals do not pay the share of tax that the law says they should (Braithwaite,
Reinhart, Mearns and Graham, 2001). A June 1998 community survey of 1000
Australians, commissioned by the ATO, found that only 32 per cent believed that
‘Tax  laws  are  effective in making  sure  large  companies  pay their share of tax’
declining to 27 per cent for ‘very wealthy people’. Only 20 per cent believed ‘The
ATO does a good job of stopping tax avoidance by large companies’, falling to 15
per cent believing  ‘The ATO does a good job stopping tax avoidance by very
wealthy people’ (see also Wirth, 1998).
Such  perceptions  are a major risk to voluntary compliance by individual
taxpayers. The reason is that there is evidence that individuals are more willing to
pay their taxes honestly when they perceive most others to be honest; this evidence
suggests that the direction of causality here is that when citizens perceive  most
others to be cheating, they are  more likely to cheat  themselves (Levi, 1988;
Scholz, 1998; see also Cowell, 1990).
Perceptions are so entrenched that it is past the point of government trying to
pretend to the Australian people that all large corporations are paying a share of the
tax burden commensurate with the share of Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) taxpayers.
The better way to manage this risk to the revenue is to be open with the Australian
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not that companies are cheating in large numbers. It is that some large corporations
are aggressively planning their way around Australian law and moving profits and
losses around the globe to limit tax liability.
The Judiciary in a Democracy and Tax Compliance
Of equal importance, a full and frank public debate about the nature of the problem
is the way to begin to bring the Australian judiciary to an understanding of their
central importance to solving the problem. The behaviour of the judiciary in the
aftermath of tax  reform is ultimately the most critical  risk in the new ATO
environment. History teaches us that when judges are  literalist in the way they
interpret tax law, legal entrepreneurs will open up more and more loopholes in the
law. Yet because judges are properly independent of the executive government, it
is not appropriate for the ATO to ‘tackle’ the judiciary when they fail to interpret
tax law in a more purposive way.
So another path is needed. Most Australian judges believe in the sovereignty
of parliament or the sovereignty of the Australian people or both. A tax
compliance debate that engages the parliament with the desire of its people, openly
expressed, that the law be interpreted to require large corporations to pay the share
of tax the law intends is the best way to seek to move judges who believe in a
sovereign parliament responding to a sovereign people. The judges understand that
a literalist approach to tax adjudication can survive while tax law remains arcane to
the people; equally, they understand that judicial repute suffers in the  democracy
when  this  approach is later discredited in the eyes of the people and their
parliament, as happened to the Australian judiciary in the 1980s (Levi, 1988). In
the long run, court cases  like the recent Packer saga, which led to Australia’s
richest person being accused in the press of paying virtually no tax, are corrosive
of respect of the people for the law and the courts.
3  The more open the public
debate on tax law, the more clear it will be to the judiciary why this is so, and the
more pointedly will they grasp the necessity and propriety of their being more
purposive and less literalist readers of tax law.
Margaret Levi’s (1988) analysis of the 1983-85 tax reform debate is that it
engaged the Australian people in a way that increased their preparedness to comply
with the tax laws. Part of this accomplishment was that they did see the Barwick
(literalist)  era of judicial  interpretation in tax matters, of which they came to
disapprove, come to an end.
Understanding Taxpayer Behaviour
Perhaps this first element of the compliance framework should be conceived more
broadly as ‘Understanding the Tax System’. The ATO Compliance Model does
take a broad view of what understanding taxpayer  behaviour  means, that is,
understanding individual and business behaviour in the context of an industry,
macroeconomic  and sociological environment. This is what is referred to as182 Taxing Democracy
BISEP
4 in the ATO Compliance Model. The key addition for the large corporate
sector is understanding compliance in an international environment. There needs to
be understanding, for example, that the taxpaying behaviour of a Japanese
transnational corporation in Japan is different from its taxpaying behaviour in other
countries.
The ATO approach to understanding taxpayer behaviour is risk management of
a tax system. The ATO has been influenced by voluntary Australian Standard
4360, which identifies the stages in risk management in Figure 9.2.
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Figure 9.2 Stages of risk management (from Grey and Cooper, 1998)
The ATO generally has done a good job of the first four stages of this  process,
particularly at a strategic and organisational level, but is only beginning to do a
good job on the fifth stage (Treat the Risk), and is still doing a poor job on the
final stage (Monitor and Review). In establishing the context, identifying the risks
and analysing the risks, the ATO has the advantage of being an unusually
knowledge-rich organisation. It takes research  seriously. While there  are  gaps in
this knowledge which need to be filled, the bigger challenge is to find existing
knowledge and synthesise its implications.
While ATO staff are  increasingly on top of risk analysis and assessment,
mostly they do not operate by searching and seizing opportunities to leverage
those risks. Ask in a large business industry segment in the ATO whether they
have assessed and ranked risks and they will pull out a document that shows where
they  have  done  that. This is genuinely impressive. But ask fieldwork or
management staff to tell you the best stories of how they have leveraged each of
those risks and only some will enthuse with their triumphs.
Risk leveraging is a creative activity. It requires creative staff. It is a bad idea
to  provide a formula for how to do it because  advisers  will soon learn  that
formula.  Continuous  reinvention of risk leveraging is what will  keep  them
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leveraging seems to us to require taking storytelling more seriously within a tax
authority. The ATO has begun to move away from being a business run according
to a procedures manual (see  Job and Honaker, Chapter 6, this volume). At the
level of informal staff interaction, ATO culture is no longer just a rulebook, it is
also a storybook.
Some staff see ATO management culture, in contrast, as a thicket of models
(an  observation  also made by Job and Honaker, Chapter 6, this volume). The
challenge is to value stories that make sense of models and models that provide a
conceptual scheme for generating better stories. One staff response to the roll-out
of the ATO Compliance Model was: ‘Oh no, not another model. Now a [ATO]
Compliance Model to add to Risk Assessment,…System Analysis and Planning,
Strategic Direction, Performance Management,  Business Systems models,
Accountability and Governance,  and on and on’. Our suggestion is that the
approach to moving the ATO risk management model beyond risk assessment to
risk  leveraging is to create a framework for  storytelling about compliance
successes. Some leading corporations, such as 3-M, have come to the conclusion
that an excess of abstraction is their problem and have taken the remedy so far as
to write their strategic plan in storytelling fashion (Shaw, Brown and Bromiley,
1998). The rationale for the storytelling approach  lies in optimising human
capacity for not only digesting information but also acting on it.
Stories are central to human intelligence  and memory. Cognitive scientist William
Calvin describes how we gradually  acquire the ability to formulate plans through
the stories we hear in childhood. From stories, a child learns to ‘imagine a course of
action, imagine its effects on others, and decide whether or not to do it’...Cognitive
scientists  have  established  that lists, in contrast, are  remarkably hard to
remember...(Shaw, Brown and Bromiley, 1998, p. 42).
There are two  interconnected staff morale rationales for considering a
storytelling culture. One is that staff grapple  with many models that are  often
presented to them abstractly rather than as stories. The second is that there is the
feeling  that those who are  playing an aggressive game are  winning.  Hence, a
framework for storytelling with stories of success that bring to life models, such
as the ATO risk management model,  are  needed. A suggestion is therefore  that
parts of the ATO that are not already doing so conduct regular informal workshops
which give staff a platform to share  their latest success stories. This means a
different kind of best practice workshop than sometimes happened in the past, one
that is less oriented to concepts and models of best practice and more oriented to
stories of best practice (from which an understanding of models flows). Each ATO
large business segment would then select its best success stories and the ones that
supply lessons of more general  applicability  for best practice  workshops. A
consequence of such a culture change  would be that ‘heroes’ of risk  leveraging
success  stories  would be noticed in a way that would percolate  into  their
performance reviews.
Our analysis, in summary, is that the abstractness of ATO risk  assessment
might be a roadblock to the contextual staff creativity that moves into risk
leveraging. In the next stage of the development of a compliance framework, one
suggestion would be for a document more dotted with  success  stories than this
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business stories anonymous. Perhaps it would be more appropriately cautious
about confidentiality to sustain storytelling only as an oral tradition for those staff
dealing with large business tax compliance. But at the least, our recommendation
would be that it be a more deeply institutionalised oral tradition – a proliferation
of storytelling best practice workshops that illuminate broad strategic issues.
A move to institutionalising ATO culture more as a storybook (Shearing and
Ericson, 1991) than a rulebook or a model-book is not to downplay the importance
of rules and models. Internal rules and models will be more sensible when they
connect with a more bottom-up process of reflection on accumulations of success
stories. Risk leveraging occurs at two levels. One is at the level of clinical analysis
of cases of single corporations – for example, diagnosing patterns of imbalance
among corporate PAYG receipts and wages paid, Goods and Services Tax (GST)
receipts and income tax to inform a risk leveraging  prognosis to heal the ailing
taxpayer. The second level is cross-case  leveraging  through more quantitative
analysis of strategies (see Braithwaite, Pittelkow and Williams, Chapter 10, this
volume).
The risk leveraging skill at the first level is the skill of the clinician who heals
one patient. That is the level most informed by storytelling. The second level
requires the skill of the medical researcher who finds generic therapies that will be
valuable for curing many patients. That is the level most  informed by number
crunching.
Tax authorities worldwide develop statistical models akin to a regression
equation. For example, given what is known about the income of this company,
the proportion of its activities based offshore, the industry sector it is in,
movements in its stock price, the various ratings it has received by ratings
agencies, and certain other pieces of known information, is it paying less company
tax than the model predicts or more? Those that are paying a great deal less tax
than the model predicts can then be approached to seek explanation and possibly
be audited.
Watching an industry or other group of taxpayers can also be done to diagnose
risk with the techniques of the detective, akin to the clinical skills of the doctor
discussed  earlier. The officer  scans the horizon for information on industry
developments that might have tax implications. A new subsidiary is opened in the
Bahamas. Three industry leaders have a secret meeting in which they agree not to
compete on tax planning; they will all pay around 10 per cent so that they have
enough for their franking credits. A new CEO with a reputation for aggressive tax
planning is appointed to a formerly conservative  company.  Detection of these
developments leads to real time enquiries (as opposed to an audit years later) that
prevent tax losses before they occur.
Building trust is and should be a fundamental value of tax authorities. When a
relationship of trust is built with a particular  client, this can be drawn on to
leverage compliance. Once there is trust, that trust is a resource that has benefits to
both sides (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992, Chapter 2). Those benefits imply a cost
to breach of trust. Good tax office  staff learn how to use their relationships to
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that it be done), when it is best to ‘trust but verify’, and when it is best to
withhold trust. We should never forget that cooperative relationships are the best
source of evidence of what is going on in the business world. Even the best
detectives  are  trusted by a lot of criminals. More  importantly,  however, the
evidence from the research program of the Australian National University research
group on business regulatory compliance is that when regulators treat regulatees as
trustworthy, they actually behave in a more trustworthy fashion (Braithwaite and
Levi, 1998). More specifically, treating business as trustworthy does increase their
subsequent compliance with the law (Braithwaite and Makkai, 1994).
It would be a mistake to see  the regression-, detective-, and trust-based risk
leveraging  approaches as only about the targeting of taxpayers. If regression
analyses show that all 30 of the clients of a particular adviser are way below the
regression line, it may be more efficient to target enforcement against one adviser
than 30 taxpayers. The same point applies with detective- and trust-based analyses
of intelligence. So there  may be virtue in considering a strategic intelligence
matrix of the form illustrated in Table 9.1.
Table 9.1 Illustrative matrix of regression-based, detective-based and trust-
based leveraging of risks posed by imaginary taxpayer, agent and
adviser to that taxpayer
Taxpayer Agent Adviser
Regression Below line Average 90% of clients below
line
Detective No intelligence No intelligence Rumoured to be
promoting a new
dubious scheme
Trust Trust but verify Trustworthy Breach of trust with ATO
in past
An intelligence assessment of this table quickly leads to the conclusion that
this taxpayer is not a good target for audit or some other form of monitoring. Nor
is the agent who submits the taxpayer’s return. However, the adviser this taxpayer
uses is a prime target for risk leveraging, one reason  being that our presently
honest taxpayer may be at risk of being tempted by the adviser’s dubious new tax
planning scheme. For certain kinds of compliance strategies (e.g. a letter to request
that a certain matter has been checked), the trustworthy agent may be the better
target precisely because they have a stronger interest in maintaining their reputation
with the ATO as trustworthy than does the taxpayer. There is a growing literature
on when it is better to target gatekeepers and when it is better to target principals
(Kraakman,  1984; Braithwaite, 1997). Our main point here is that the
‘Understanding  Taxpayer  Behaviour’ element of the ATO Compliance Model186 Taxing Democracy
should be conceived  broadly to include an understanding of the behaviour of
gatekeepers to taxpayers.
Evidence Based Tax Administration: Learning from Medicine
It was not until 1914 that in the average encounter between a doctor and a patient
the patient was more likely to come away better off than worse off. Unfortunately
with law enforcement, we have probably not yet reached  1914. If we put more
police into a neighbourhood, we are just as likely to increase the crime rate as to
reduce it. The reason is that, like doctors with leeches, police do a lot of things
that make crime worse (as well as a lot that makes it better).
Law enforcement needs to learn two things from medicine. One  big step
medicine  took  toward  making us healthier early this  century was a research
investment in randomised controlled trials of its risk leveraging  strategies. If it
believed a particular therapy or a particular pill would outperform  existing
therapies, it would randomly assign a large group of patients to the new treatment
versus the old. In effect, this meant tossing a coin to decide whether patients got
the currently popular therapy or the new one. With a large  enough sample, the
miracle of randomisation delivered two groups that were  exactly  comparable in
every way other than the treatment. If fewer patients died under the new therapy,
then we could be fairly sure that the therapy was the reason. This was the big
advance  over the old  science  that allowed quacks to delude themselves into
believing that when patients got better after being treated with leeches that it was
the  leeches  that  cured  them. Or when they died that the leeches  had not been
applied early and often enough.
As  more and more therapeutic advances increased our life expectancy,
medicine’s new problem was of too much knowledge. Most doctors were not up-
to-date  with what science  was  finding. So a new  evidence-based  medicine
movement to get the results of science  through to doctors in a digestible form
began: A science of diffusing science through soft networks of revered peers. The
nation that ventures into an evidence-based  tax administration comparable to
evidence-based medicine is likely to become the cutting edge. Evidence-based tax
administration will be much cheaper than evidence-based medicine and much less
fraught with ethical dilemmas.
Imagine a tax authority comes up with an idea for a new auditing product,
which it believes will improve compliance at lower cost. Some people think they
are wrong, others that they are  right. A new  evidence-based Commissioner  sees
that  there  are some good arguments on both sides. Moreover,  they both have
equally good arguments as to why their approach would be procedurally fairer and
cheaper for taxpayers, so there are no ethical arguments against experimentation.
There are resources available for 200 audits where this kind of audit is relevant. So
the Commissioner requires that a risk analysis select the 200 most suitable targets
for audit. A random number generator then assigns 100 of these cases to the new
audit product and 100 to the old audit.Large Business and the Compliance Model 187
Where there are one or two extremely large or atypical corporations these might
be excluded from the experiment on grounds that if both ended up in the same
group, this would skew the results. Or the randomisation can block on them, so
that it is guaranteed that one will go into the experimental group, the other into
the control group. Absent such extraordinary  lumpiness, the laws of probability
prove that randomly assigning two hundred companies or two hundred individuals
is almost certain to produce two groups with almost identical breakdowns on
average  income, age, sex, in fact  anything we can measure and  check  (and
everything that we cannot measure and check). The only reason for a difference in
tax paid by the two groups is that one gets the old style audit rather than the new
style audit. There is no need for complicated multiple  regression  analysis. Tax
officers just count how much money comes through the door from the new audit
group compared to the old audit group.
An even better research design will require a risk assessment to identify the
300 best targets for auditing. Then the computer will assign 100 to the new audit,
100 to the old audit, 100 to no audit. It might be that even though the new audit
brings in more tax than the old audit, over a three year follow up, neither group
outperforms the ‘no audit’ group. The reason might be that the ‘no audit’ group are
afraid of an audit in years two and three, while the audit groups believe they get a
free kick for those two years.
Under both research designs it is possible to test which is the cheaper process
to run without having to contend with doubters who say the new process was
cheaper only because it was tried out on less complicated audits. Randomisation
will  have assured that on average  the new and old groups are of equal
complication.
In few areas of problem-solving could randomised controlled trials be more
viable than in tax administration. It has been necessary to the  advancement of
medicine to randomly assign sick patients to a placebo (an inert pill) or to no
treatment when they might have been helped. While many of us are  alive today
because this was done, it raised awful ethical dilemmas. There is not this level of
ethical dilemma in randomly assigning a high risk taxpayer to miss out on an
audit. There would be in a world where the community regarded it as just that all
high risk taxpayers should be audited. The world of tax is not such a world – the
supply of compliance work is always less than the need for it; a high risk company
that is randomly assigned to no audit this year can always be purposively assigned
to audit next year or the year after or both. However high their risk, a tax authority
cannot afford to audit them every year.
Many other kinds of compliance initiatives have the same character as audit in
these regards. Consider, for example, an interesting initiative of simply writing to
companies in the manufacturing sector that have paid no tax for three years to say
that the ATO is concerned about this situation and requests them to write with an
indication of whether they think their circumstances  will  change  such that they
will be paying some tax next year. The hypothesis is that the fear  that they are
being monitored in some special way will cause them to pay more tax in the next
year. 100 companies could be randomly assigned to no letter and no audits; 100
companies to the letter and X audits for those who fail to reply with an indication
that they expect to pay tax next year; 100 to no letter and X audits; 100 to the
letter and no audits. This design would enable an assessment of whether the
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increases tax receipts even  without  backing them up with audits for those who
ignore them. Or whether this would only work when coupled with a commitment
to do something if tax did not come in.
A major advantage  that tax has in enabling randomised controlled trials in
comparison with medicine is that it has the entire population of taxpayers on the
computer, so randomisation with high external validity can be done at low cost.
Most  people who do not have  experience of randomisation doubt that with
corporations you would get an experimental group and a control group that would
be identical on relevant characteristics. A needed confidence-building measure is to
ask the doubters to name the variables on which the experimental group might end
up different from the control group. The data would be collected to show that the
two groups had the same value on average for these measures.
Building Community Partnerships
Building community partnerships is the second element of the ATO Compliance
Model. Indeed this model itself was the product of a community partnership, with
active and constructive participation by business,  non-government organisations
(NGOs) and professions.
In the next section on increasing the flexibility of tax office  operations we
consider the idea of not only co-designing compliance strategies with industry in
the way this is already being done, but also using external  stakeholders as ‘test
pilots’ of the new designs when they are first put into the field. Partnership with
the judiciary is out of the question from a separation of powers perspective.
However, as argued in the early part of this chapter, there is a need for a richer
dialogue among community-ATO-parliament, carried forward at public conferences
and in the media, to which the judiciary is exposed and chooses to respond as it
sees appropriate.
A dilemma of business-industry partnership is that business norms are not pro-
tax, but anti-tax (witness the egg-shape of compliance in Figure 9.1). A risk of
partnership, therefore, is that the tax office will be captured by an anti-taxpaying
culture. One idea for a new paradigm of community partnership to respond to this
change of capture would, we suspect, be premature  until some of the other
strategies in this chapter were given more time to work. This is the idea of the
government  negotiating with the business community a compliance-tax-rate-
spiral. The reason it may be a bad idea at this time is that there  are  too many
corporations presently paying no tax who therefore have no interest in trading off
higher compliance for lower company tax rates. However, floating the possibility
of a compliance-tax-rate-spiral  as something that might work in future could
encourage public-regarding business taxpayers to see that in the long run there is
much that Australian business could gain from a more cooperative compliance
culture.
So how would a compliance-tax-rate-spiral work? The tax authority would set
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that involved an estimate of the extra dollars brought in by improved compliance.
As  each  benchmark  was  met, the government’s  promise would be to reduce
company tax rates by 2 per cent. If all five corporate compliance benchmarks were
surpassed, the company tax rate  would fall by 10 per  cent. The compliance
benchmarks would be set so that the aggregate increase in revenue from increased
tax and increased  penalties on non-compliers at each  benchmark  would be
calibrated at the cost of a 2 per cent tax cut. It would be highly desirable to
incorporate tax penalties into the formula because  this would give community-
minded businesses an incentive to lend political support to higher penalties for
non-compliers (that would be returned to compliers in lower tax rates). Business
partnerships might be built on reversing the existing reality where non-compliers
do not pay and compliers make up for it, with a mechanism where non-compliers
pay monies that are channeled directly to compliers.
While the government would generate no extra revenue by giving back all the
gains from higher compliance and higher penalties in lower tax rates, it would
generate a little  extra  revenue as the  compliance  rate  moved up between
benchmarks.  Both business and the ATO would benefit from lower tax
administration costs as the system moved to a more cooperative, less combative,
compliance regime. But most importantly, business and government would both
benefit from the higher income that a low tax, low litigation, high compliance
compact would bring.
The idea for the moment would be to do no more than introduce this into the
debate. Not something that seems plausible, but something that signals the kind
of world that might one day be possible if only we can learn how to forge a more
meaningful business-community-government partnership toward a decent tax
system.
Why call this a compliance-tax-rate-spiral? We assume two things. First, once
the difficult challenge of achieving the first compliance benchmark had been met
and the first tax cut delivered, momentum toward achieving the second benchmark
would be easier – a virtuous circle that would feed upon itself. Once cooperative
businesses had tasted the benefits of an initial 2 per cent tax cut, they might even
lobby for higher tax penalties (all of which would be returned to them) to deliver
more quickly the next 2 per cent cut. Increased compliance would not depend upon
industry associations compelling their members to improve their compliance. It
would depend on: (a) changing the nature of the social bargain between  business
and government (Levi, 1988) so that business actually wanted to comply with the
law; (b) changing business culture so that business leaders  disapproved of their
business colleagues who did not comply with the law (as free riders on the rest of
the business community and obstructers of national economic growth); and (c)
business leaders politically supporting higher tax penalties and other measures to
enforce  the law against the grey economy (such as providing intelligence on
dubious tax planning schemes to the ATO).190 Taxing Democracy
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Figure 9.3 The Compliance-Tax-Rate-Spiral
There is also an economic  analysis of why the idea advanced here is a
compliance-tax-rate-spiral.  There is empirical  evidence  that as tax rates  fall,
compliance becomes economically rational for more individual  taxpayers and
voluntary compliance increases (Friedland, Maital and Rutenberg, 1978; Clotfelter,
1983; Baldry, 1987; Alm, Jackson and McKee, 1992; Williams, 1995; Joulfaian
and Rider, 1996; Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein, 1998; but see  Feinstein, 1991;
Alm, Bahl and Murray, 1993). Hence the virtuous circle is set up (see Figure 9.3).
A cut in the tax rate increases voluntary compliance and the increase in voluntary
compliance moves the system down the path to the next 2 per cent tax cut.
Increased Flexibility in ATO Operations to Encourage and Support
Compliance
The approach of the ATO Compliance Model values flexibility, showing that there
are  many ways of delivering on compliance and objectives of the Taxpayers’
Charter. Institutionalising a storytelling culture is one way of fostering flexibility.
Success stories that grab people’s interest will be stories of innovation, of more
flexible responses than have been attempted in the past.
A growing source of flexibility is to take problems to international forums.
The Advance Pricing Arrangement (APA, called Advanced Pricing Agreements in
many  countries) is one approach to locking in higher tax receipts from
transnational corporations (Killaly, 1996). APAs are  negotiated  arrangements
between the ATO and corporations on transfer pricing methodologies negotiated at
the OECD, which result in an appropriate  allocation of income and expenses
between related parties that  are  selling goods or services between different
countries. Negotiating APAs is painstaking work, but because they lock in higher
returns than audits do and because  they shift the rules of the game to more
cooperative ones with business, the investment is well justified.
On the other hand, the ATO needs to monitor the cost of keeping APAs up to
date in the face of company-,  product- and time-specific changes  that make the
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clean’ companies would ask for APAs, hence  skewing ATO activity to areas of
low risk. Initially, companies were  reluctant to enter into APA negotiations
because they feared this may have revealed tax liabilities going back over many
years. However since then APAs have become widely used. The kind of flexibility
of ATO response that could be examined is for the ATO to consider granting an
amnesty on tax liabilities going back more than two years as part of the incentive
for entering into negotiations. International tax competition can cause compliance
problems that can only be addressed through international cooperation via forums
such as the OECD and multi-lateral APAs. The same international imperatives
apply with tax havens, E-commerce and a variety of other questions.
The real power to increase flexibility does not lie with senior managers so
much as with fieldworkers  who  are  daily at the coalface  (Sparrow,  2000).
Fieldworkers must be the key risk identifiers. Their  performance  reviews  should
give high priority to evidence of identifying  wider  risks in the course of their
fieldwork, documenting them and following through to ensure  that the risks are
analysed and treated. In the view of some, this follow through is not their job.
Their  job is to report  the  risks they identify to their immediate boss so that
management can take care of it. This is neither our view nor that of senior ATO
management involved in large business compliance work. The ATO needs more
leadership from below. Fieldworkers can often report risks to Segment Managers
who can be too busy to follow through on them. It is often more efficient for the
fieldworker  with the direct experience of the risk to chase it up through the
bureaucracies, to participate in the senior discussions there on what can be done to
treat it and then to offer to be a ‘test pilot’ for the treatment – to report back
whether  the treatment is working with the initial kind of risk they identified.
Better still, the fieldworker might recruit one of the clients they work with to be
an external test pilot as well, and also participate in the discussion at senior levels
concerning the problem they have decided to own.
If  tax professionals at all levels of the ATO from fieldworkers up are
encouraged to be leaders (see Job and Honaker, Chapter 6, this volume), to own
risks with a commitment to follow through all the stages of risk management,
then loop closing will improve. Most critically, the law reform loop will respond
faster, and fieldworker morale will improve compared to a situation where they sit
on their hands and grumble about management dropping the ball. What follows is
that the tax authority storytelling culture needs to be about stories of junior
employees being rewarded in performance reviews for following risks right through
to  treatment and evaluation. In few areas is this more important than law
improvement.
Flexible Adjustment of Tax Law
In the midst of the wave of tax law reform currently being experienced in Australia
we must remember that it is naïve to believe that we can ever reform tax law and
get it right in a way that will remain right for long. Nothing is more important to
improving corporate tax  compliance  than law reform. But the reality is that as
soon as the new law is in place, there will be legal entrepreneurs who will be at
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that will make it progressively obsolete. So law reform is not the task of an
historic moment, but a continuous process.
The ship of tax reform  needs to be continually rebuilt at sea as legal
entrepreneurs open up one leak after another. Every decade or so the accumulation
of extra pieces added to the ship to plug these holes will start to weigh it down
with an excessive burden of complexity. The ship then has to be taken into dock
and rebuilt from the ground up in a more simplified way. The most crucial
assessment of the health of the system must involve a sophisticated group looking
periodically at the ship to assess whether  the overall pattern of its  complexity
justifies such a systemic legal refit. Plugging holes at sea and periodic
simplifications of the whole structure are  both  recurrently necessary because an
accumulation of new rules to plug old loopholes can be a resource for opening up
new loopholes. Complexity favours  the legal entrepreneurs.  The objective is to
give the judges only as much detail as they need to apply the policy purposes of
the law with as much certainty as is possible for the contrived uniqueness of the
circumstances with which they are continually  presented (see McBarnet,  Chapter
11, this volume).
The job of fieldworkers is to be the  antennae  that  detect  those risky new
contrivances as early as possible. A good auditor has the ability to see  that an
issue that has come up in an audit will be a risk to the revenue in many other cases
unless the law is clarified or improved. Provision exists for auditors to identify
risks on case files that are available for computer analysis to group problems that
are looking for common solutions. The culture change needed is one where writing
down the risk is just the beginning of a process for the fieldworker of following
the risk through to ensure there is a ruling or litigation to clarify the case law, an
actual change in the law, or a principled decision to let the risk sit there until the
next comprehensive reform of the law. At every stage the fieldworker has a role as
a reality tester for the lawyers, as an antenna to detect the latest manoeuvre of the
other side and as a test pilot for the proposed legal remedy.
Tax law will become more certain and effective when fieldworkers are engaged
with the daunting challenge of continuous improvement of a living law rather than
the narrow challenge of enforcing a static law. It will become even more certain
and effective if fieldworkers engage the public-regarding side of large business at
the coalface, where the problem in the law breaks out, to help repair the law in the
public interest. Law reform in the past has been too top-down and insufficiently
continuous. Also, as argued at the beginning of the chapter, it has not engaged the
people of Australia in public discussion and understanding often enough. The
ATO needs to persuade  the people of Australia that more equitable and certain
enforcement of the tax law is something they can reasonably demand of their
institutions – the parliament, the judiciary and the ATO. By articulating forcefully
to the Australian people that the ATO does not want to be let off the hook for tax
integrity, it makes it harder for the parliament and judiciary to be allowed off the
hook (which to a significant extent they have been in the past).
It is doubtful that any amount of synoptic brilliance in re-configuring tax law
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what is required is for us to be more  pre-emptive  through a continuous
improvement  process of simplification-clarification-resimplification-clarification.
This  iterates  endlessly.  Commitment to excellence in the  pre-emptiveness and
responsiveness  required for continuous improvement of tax law is the key.
Australia can have a high integrity tax system, but only if the ATO, the parliament
and the judiciary jointly end the buck-passing. My plea is that the ATO publicly
put up its hand and force the hands of the other institutions.
Flexible Dispute Resolution
Improved disputing can improve compliance considerably. The reason is the now
substantial evidence that when people and companies believe they have experienced
fair procedures, they  are  more likely to comply with the law (Lind and Tyler,
1988; Tyler, 1990, 1998; Tyler and Dawes, 1993; Makkai and Braithwaite, 1996).
The Large  Corporate  volume of the ATO Professionalism Survey does show
procedural fairness to be a concern of large corporates with ATO staff  (Donovan
Research, 1998).
Adversarialism arises often in tax fieldwork. Procrastination as an alternative to
resolving disputes commonly uses delaying tactics such as manipulating the
administrative privilege of accountants, Freedom of Information requests,
administrative law hearings, holding back on assistance with providing requested
records, providing only parts of the information requested, and failing to attend
meetings. Good tax office practice is to refuse to tolerate failure by either party to
resolve disputes. Otherwise the agency hands victory to the people who practice
‘Defer, Delay, Defeat’. Headbutting or delay that is obstructing resolution can be
dealt with by widening the circle involved in the dispute. Some large businesses
are  alert to this option themselves as they regularly go over the head of
fieldworkers to their superiors. Experience demonstrates it to be a good option for
the large business fieldworker as well (and so does theory, Braithwaite, 1997). If a
matter is important enough, the fieldworker’s senior manager can write to the CEO
saying, in effect, ‘We need you to supply this information in a timely fashion so
we can settle this matter. We can use our powers to compel you to do so and stand
ready to go to court to enforce this. But this is not the way we like to do business.
Can we meet and exchange  the information we need to get this dispute over
with?’. At lower levels, an auditor having difficulty with the tax manager of a
company can ask for a meeting with the tax manager and his boss together, and
then with the boss’s boss if that meeting accomplishes no reconciliation.
The rationale for this path to flexible dispute resolution is that large businesses
are full of many adversarial people and many cooperative people. The trick is to
move up the organisation through various layers of adversarial managers until the
tax officer reaches a cooperative manager who insists that the matter be settled
rather than take up more of everyone’s time. Actually, the grounds for optimism
that this works are even stronger than suggested so far. Even the most adversarial
of executives have a cooperative, socially responsible self as well as a combative
self (see Braithwaite, Chapter 2, this volume). The gifted tax officer has the ability
to treat clients with a respect that persuades even the most combative of them to
put forward their socially responsible self. If she has a bad day where she fails to
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she hopes to catch the new player when his socially responsible self is to the fore.
Moving up the organisation until a more senior cooperative person is found who
will instruct the junior obstructionist to cooperate can be time-consuming. But it
is less time-consuming than escalating prematurely to setting up an arbitration or
litigation, or leaving the problem to fester.
More and Escalating Regulation Options to Enforce Compliance
The ATO has in recent years made considerable movement down this path
recommended by the ATO Compliance Model. Following the external evaluation
of the Large Case Program
5 (Pappas, Carter, Evans and Koop, 1992), the ATO
moved from full audit as a more or less standard single compliance product to a
suite of audit products: roll-over audits,  pre-lodgment  audits, last year  lodged
audits, specific issues audits, loss tracking audits, new legislation/ruling  reviews
and  record  retention audits.  Industry watching briefs and tax strategy reviews
(which are risk assessments rather  than audits) also became  important  fieldwork
tools. The suite of products provide greater choice and flexibility to better target
risk treatments; and taxpayers, subject to enforcement, can experience varying
types of fieldwork contact, making them more careful in their tax affairs. Even if
they have a full audit in one year, they cannot rule out some special purpose audit
in the next year.
The ATO Compliance Model is a compliance pyramid, with  cooperative and
educative compliance options at the base escalating to progressively more
enforcement-oriented  and punitive options as we move up the pyramid. The
philosophy is to consider cooperative strategies first and only escalate up through
each  layer of the pyramid as each  lower level of the pyramid fails to deliver
compliance. This  raises the question of why not try reward at the base of the
compliance pyramid.
Some ATO staff and corporates considered it improper to reward large business
for what was seen as meeting their legal obligations. This concern seems especially
apt in light of experience with other areas of regulation where financial incentives
to meet legal obligations have engendered some perverse incentives to deliver the
form, but not the substance, of what is intended to be rewarded.  The ATO,
however, can make a special effort to give a service ‘beyond the call of duty’ to
clients who have an exemplary record on compliance and cooperation in making
the tax system work. For example, they could be given extra quick turnaround of
advisings. Indeed, it might only be as particularly trustworthy taxpayers that they
could be given this: Mutual trust enables an advisings  process to be transacted
more time-efficiently. The time-efficiency can be achieved by increasing ATO
preparedness to accept the corporate’s tax analysis and relying on verification of
selected key components of that analysis. The service of the Key Client Manager,
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Indeed, in light of the desirability of rewarding  greater  compliance  with  better
service  where  this is a principled thing to do, Key  Client Managers  could be
allocated to the largest 100  corporate  taxpayers  in the country, measured by
amount of tax paid over the past five years, rather  than to the largest 100
corporations in income.
The Canadian Audit Protocols (Revenue  Canada, 1996) are  not just about a
move to real  time and better coordinated  audits; they are  also about building
cooperative  relationships.  Negotiated  Protocols  offer  the potential to reduce
compliance costs for business and increase compliance effectiveness for the ATO.
This might involve scheduling visits by different  areas of the ATO so that
disruption to business is minimised, holding concurrent  audits, and assisting
business with knowing in advance the form in which financial records  might be
kept to avoid double handling. The key idea is that a tax administrator and
participating  large  businesses  can  jointly  produce a written  framework  that
establishes guidelines and standards for building and maintaining a relationship for
managing compliance.
While financial rewards  that  are  identified as rewards  for compliance can be
dangerous in the signal they give, this is not true of the informal rewards of praise
and giving credit where credit is due. Moreover, most people underestimate how
important these are to assisting business regulatory  compliance. In Makkai and
Braithwaite’s (1993) study of Australian nursing home regulation, the use of
informal  praise by government inspectors was associated with improved
compliance over the next two  years after controlling  for other causes of
compliance. An activity that could be underestimated in its value is a letter from
the Commissioner to a large corporation that has moved from an obstructionist to
a  cooperative  approach to compliance. Such a letter could thank the relevant
executives of the corporation for the cooperation they afforded to ATO staff in
doing their job and for the reasonableness  they displayed in assuring that
agreement could be reached on a just tax assessment. On all manner of smaller
things, thank-you letters by more junior ATO staff and face-to-face expressions of
appreciation are important compliance activities.
Large  businesses that have exemplary corporate compliance systems and
governance processes especially merit positive recognition both verbally and/or in
writing. In a storytelling regulatory culture, success stories should not be restricted
to good things tax officers do; they should include stories of best practice among
large business, such as corporate compliance systems and governance processes put
in place by corporates. This can be institutionalised by nurturing tax compliance
professionalism in the way the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission has done with Trade Practices professionalism (through establishing
the Association of Compliance Professionals in Australia) and consumer affairs
(through initiating the Society of Consumer Affairs Professionals in Business).
Informal recognition in the form of expedited service (e.g., advisings), praise
and recognition as a public-regarding corporate citizen (as by involvement in the
co-design of ATO policies) are therefore possible at the base of a compliance
pyramid  (see  Figure 9.4). They can be combined with educative  measures, the
most important of which is advice  and  encouragement to establish  credible
corporate  compliance  systems.  Accreditation is one path to nurturing tax
compliance professionalism (or risk self-assessment).196 Taxing Democracy
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Figure 9.4 One illustration of a large business compliance pyramid
The first step up a large business compliance pyramid might be a Tax Strategy
Review that checked  directors’  minutes,  working papers, accounting and tax
manuals, audit files, financial planning files, budgets/forecasts and the like. This
is a small step up the pyramid for a large corporation. It is hardly an enforcement
step at all, merely a risk assessment exercise. Nevertheless, it is a good first step
to  take when perhaps all that is required is a signal that the tax authority is
reviewing the affairs of the business.
The second step might be Real Time Enquiries to clarify a concern; the third a
Special Purpose Audit or other low-intensity cooperative audit; the fourth a Full
Cooperative Audit (see Figure 9.4). When escalated cooperative audits meet with
repeated obstructionism, escalation to what might be called ‘Assertive Use of ATO
Powers’ could be deployed with little hesitation. This means use of formal powers
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demand access to documents where this is necessary. Escalation from cooperative
audit to assertive use of ATO powers should not normally occur  until  there has
been opportunity for an ATO senior manager and the CEO to discuss cooperative
dispute resolution options.
When both obstructionism and reasonable suspicion of serious non-compliance
exists, a Litigation Task Force might be put on the case (see Figure 9.4). The
litigation task force would be multidisciplinary, including a lawyer  who would
liaise with the Director of Public Prosecutions. The obligation of the head of the
litigation task force would be to ensure that the necessary evidence was collected to
pursue prosecution and other penalties. This is not to say that maximum legal
action would be pursued; rather, the objective would be to make it clear that this
was inevitable unless the taxpayer moved the relationship down the pyramid to
more cooperative  problem resolution. There  has  been a view that the evidence
rarely  exists to warrant  higher penalties or for prosecution to be successfully
pursued. Doubts exist about this assumption. Rather, an alternative view is that a
large corporation which has escalated this far up the pyramid will be vulnerable
somewhere in its complex of activities to false and misleading statements having
been made, among other vulnerabilities. In part, this view on tough enforcement
may itself stem from a perceived lack of support from ATO managers, the ATO
itself and even the Director of Public Prosecutions. The use of a litigation task
force could help crystallise this support and more tangibly signal to the staff and
the taxpayer involved that swift and sharp enforcement will be taken.
The next rung in the compliance pyramid will be assessments/penalties that
trigger  litigation by the taxpayer  and/or prosecution by the Director of Public
Prosecutions (see Figure 9.4).
The final rung of the compliance  pyramid could be referral to the  National
Crime Authority (NCA).
6 This occurs rarely at the moment, a situation that should
continue. The NCA’s superior powers and criminal enforcement capabilities should
not be employed even on the most hardened criminals, but only on uncooperative
hardened criminals who are believed to be major tax evaders.
The pyramid in Figure 9.4 is an illustrative pyramid that may be useful in
navigating the compliance options available in large business  compliance at this
point in time. No compliance  pyramid  can be effective without  changing  over
time, with context, and in response to research findings from evidence-based risk
leveraging. Nor should this compliance  pyramid, or any other, be prescriptive.
They are no more than a guide to compliance decisions that should  never be
allowed to trump contextual wisdom. It should never be a criticism of an officer
that they are not following the ATO pyramid. It should be cause for praise when
the idea of the pyramid is used flexibly to display an utterly original array of
innovative risk leveraging  strategies  through which the ATO might  escalate in
dealing with a tough case (as Job and Honaker, Chapter 6, and Hobson, Chapter 7,
argue in this volume). Rather than slavish implementation of ‘the Model’ we
should want success stories of innovation in pyramidal thinking about leveraging
compliance.
By thinking pyramidally about the enforcement  options  available, the tax
officer  engenders confidence and motivates cooperative  compliance through198 Taxing Democracy
showing a willingness to escalate up the pyramid. A regulator who believes that
her pyramid is credible and who is willing to escalate up it if necessary rarely
actually finds it necessary to escalate far up the pyramid. Confidence about the
authority of the pyramid of enforcement  capabilities projects an image of
invincibility to the corporation  that is the subject of tough  enforcement.  This
rarely  fails to engender  cooperative  compliance at low levels of the pyramid,
enabling de-escalation to even lower levels. The effective regulator is cooperative
and trusting at first, tough if that trust is abused, tougher and tougher if it is still
abused, but forgiving if trust and cooperation is finally restored (Ayres and
Braithwaite, 1992, Chapter 2). It does not matter that escalation at lower levels of
the pyramid has very little bite with large corporations; at that level the objective
is to signal escalation rather than cutting deeply into the corporate’s interest. The
crunch is whether the tax authority is willing to escalate  until it does reach
something that bites.
For the pyramid to work, fieldworkers  must be confident  that they will get
senior management backing if they escalate. They have  that  confidence  because
they do not escalate or threaten escalation of a particular type unless they get
backing at a level that can support that level of escalation. Fieldworkers would not
escalate to an enforcement option and would not initiate assertive use of ATO
powers  without getting the backing of their leaders in advance. Fieldworkers,
however, should not assume their leader’s support when they want to escalate to
assertive use of ATO powers and beyond. They must be able to count on their
backing when the fieldworker and leader agree in advance on the circumstances of
the escalation. Once a litigation task force is established, control passes out of the
fieldworker’s hands into the hands of the head of the task force (usually a lawyer).
Assurance that at some point the lawyers take over as a matter of policy adds to
the confidence and authority of the fieldworker who can say: Look, unless we can
sort this out, the conflict will escalate to the point where ATO policy requires that
it be taken over by a Litigation Task Force. Near  the  peak of the pyramid, no
promises of escalation would be made without the backing of the Commissioner.
Of course, many of the strategies in Figure 9.4 will be deployed for risk
management  reasons  rather  than out of any desire to give a signal that the
behaviour of the taxpayer is causing their case to be taken more seriously.
Sometimes when escalation up the pyramid is occurring, the circumstances  will
warrant a jump up several  rungs of the pyramid. The pyramid represents a
preference for resolving matters at lower levels, not a rule to do so. Starting at the
base of a pyramid and moving up progressively is a presumption that can be
overridden by compelling  evidence, for example, of criminal behaviour or
aggressive tax planning, that this is a case that should go straight to the peak of
the pyramid. But we should be extremely reluctant to do that.
It is a challenge to educate people that there is no single or correct  pyramid,
but that there is virtue in having the professionalism that comes from having
thought through the range of responses through which a regulator can  escalate
when faced with  non-cooperation.  For example, one way to meet the challenge
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information. A workshop would get a group of fieldworkers  who confront a
similar group of clients with similar access  difficulties to co-design their own
pyramid of escalated response to denial of access. In the course of the workshop,
they would be shown the compliance pyramids designed by other access
workshops. Seeing their differences would both give them ideas and assurance that
they could design their own. Indeed, there would not have to be agreement at the
workshop. Different participants could go away with different pyramids that suited
their contexts. The objective would be that each  participant  would develop a
pyramid that she thinks would work for her and that she could get her supervisor
to back her on.
Conclusion
The four elements of the ATO Compliance Model: (a)  understanding  taxpayer
behaviour; (b) building community partnerships; (c) increased flexibility; and (d)
more and escalating regulatory options have been found to have relevant meanings
for large business tax policy. This is so even if it is the  case  that improving
compliance is a less satisfactory way of planning large corporate tax  objectives
than reducing risks to the revenue and increasing legal certainty. There is a long
way to go before  large  business tax enforcement achieves problem-focused
flexibility  informed by bottom-up storytelling and top-down demands for
evidence-based  risk leveraging. The field has a long way to go before it is
genuinely a regulatory craft (Sparrow, 2000). An egg-shaped form of compliance
behaviour  where  most  enforcement effort is directed at grey areas of avoidance
rather  than evasion makes the challenge  especially  difficult. It also makes it a
challenge  where  law  enforcement  and law reform  must be integrated  instead of
separated functions. My argument is that a combination of escalated  responsive
enforcement integrated with responsive law reform has some hope of shifting much
of the grey bulge of tax avoidance into tax compliance.
Notes
1 This is a revised version of a longer paper by John Braithwaite and Andrew Wirth,
‘Towards a Compliance  Framework for Large Business  Tax Compliance’,  Centre for
Tax System Integrity, Working Paper  No.  24,  The  Australian National University,
Canberra.
2 In  a  29  May  1998 presentation to the NSW Annual State Seminar of the Taxation
Institute of Australia, LB&I (Large Business  and International,  ATO)  reported  that
‘almost 60 per cent’ of its companies  were  non-taxpayers.  Consolidation  would
doubtless  reduce this  proportion  substantially  because one large corporate group
might include a number of entities that pay no tax and others that pay large
amounts.
3 Kerry Packer’s taxpaying behaviour has been subject to public scrutiny on a number
of occasions.  See, for instance,  House of Representatives  Select  Committee on the
Print Media Inquiry (1992) and The Australian (2000), ‘Packer Sues over Internet
Tax Ads’, 5 September, A. McGilvray and A. McKenzie, p. 1.
4  BISEP represents the idea that to understand  the compliance of an individual or
group, one needs to understand the environment in which they operate. The initials200 Taxing Democracy
of this acronym stand for B = Business profile, I = Industry factors, S = Sociological
factors, E = Economic factors and P = Psychological factors.
5  The Large Case Program focused ATO  audit activity on the largest corporate
taxpayers and was conducted during the later half of the 1980s and early 1990s.
6  This is a body akin to Crime  Commissions  that  have special evidence-gathering
powers  against serious organised  crime in a number of countries.  Indeed the
National Crime Authority in Australia is in transition to becoming a National Crime
Commission.
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